We investigate, through a kinetic-exchange model, the impact that an external field, like advertising and propaganda, has on opinion dynamics. We address the situations where two opposite alternatives can be selected but the possibility of indecision also exists. In this model, individuals influence each other through pairwise interactions, which can be of agreement or disagreement, and there are also external fields that can skew decision making. Two parameters are used to model the interactions with the field: one measures the sensitivity of the individuals to be influenced, another quantifies in which direction. We study this model in a fully connected social network scenario, by means of numerical simulations of the kinetic exchange dynamics and analytical results derived from the mean-field rate equations. We show how the external bias gives rise to imperfect bifurcations, and cusp catastrophes, allowing abrupt changes and hysteresis depending on the level of disagreement in interpersonal interactions and on the strength of the external influence.
Introduction
Many models of opinion dynamics, mainly those coming from the statistical physicist's community, address self-organization aspects [1] . In these cases, the purpose is to unveil how the interpersonal interactions, by themselves, contribute to shape public opinion. Moreover, assessing the conditions for the emergence of self-organized structures is very important per se since it helps to understand mechanisms that can be present in other complex systems.
Despite in a social group collective states, like consensus or polarization, can emerge from the interactions amongst individuals, without the need of any external control [2] , advertising and propaganda are always present, taking advantage of a variety of media, from conventional (such a television, radio, newspapers, outdoors, etc.) to modern robots and influencers in the internet. Therefore, their global impact and interplay with the internal interactions, which can promote the alignment to either one or other opinion [3] , is another important social phenomenon to be studied. But, as far as we know, relatively few works in the vast literature on opinion dynamics address this issue. Among them let us mention a study, based on real data of mobile's oligopoly market, on how advertising influences the choice of a given operator [4] . In that case, a critical behavior depending on the level of advertising is observed. In another paper, the effect of mass media is investigated through a variant of Sznajd model [5] , where individuals follow an external field with certain probability. Shortening of relaxation times and suppression of the order-disorder phase transition for sufficiently strong field is observed, facilitating consensus, as expected. But many questions arise, for instance which is the interplay of contrarian and undecided people with the field, or which is the impact of opposite fields.
In the present work, we focus on a binary scenario where people have two opposite choices (e.g., "for" or "against" a controversial issue, "yes" or "no" in a referendum, etc.) and indecision can also happen. The inclusion of the undecided state is important since it is known to play a role in the route to consensus [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] . We consider that the individual opinions evolve due to interactions among people that exchange their thoughts and influence each other, both positively or negatively, and also due to external voices driving the dynamics towards one of the alternatives. This is a scenario found in many real situations, where the influence of biased information may be crucial, mainly nowadays, with high ease for fast and widespread dissemination. We investigate this question by means of a model where opinions evolve through kinetic exchanges. The details of the model are defined in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we present the outcomes of simulations in fully connected networks, interpreted in terms of mean-field rate equations.
Remarks about the results of this model are discussed in Sec. 4.
Model
We consider an opinion formation model based on kinetic exchange rules of interaction [14, 7, 8, 9, 6] . Each individual i, in a population of size N, possesses an opinion o i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, which indicates whether i has a positive or negative position about the topic under discussion (i.e., o i = ±1), or an undecided (neutral) attitude (o i = 0).
Opinions are updated via Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. At each iteration, two agents are randomly sorted and their opinions are updated. Updating is governed by kinetic exchange and by the influence of an external contribution that promotes alignment to one of the alternatives, according to
where Φ i represents the contribution of the external field to mold the opinion of agent i and µ ij is the strength of the influence of agent j over i. Moreover, this influence can be either of agreement (positive) or disagreement (negative). Negative interactions can be seen as a kind of contrarian behavior [15, 16] , which means that agent i tends to adopt the opposite opinion of agent j (counter-imitation). If Eq. (1) yields higher (lower) values than 1 (−1), then the opinion is set to the corresponding extreme value 1 (−1).
In the current setup, we consider that the coupling is an annealed random variable, controlled by the parameter p according to
where p represents the average fraction of negative interactions, that is, of individuals which follow the contrarian behavior. Notice that in general µ ij = µ ji , but this is irrelevant in the annealed version.
The external contribution acting in Eq. (1) is also an annealed random variable, defined as
The external influence can be turned off by setting φ = 0. In this case, it is well-known that the system undergoes a non-equilibrium order-disorder phase transition [8, 9] , at the critical value of the fraction of negative interactions p c = 0.25. When 0 < φ ≤ 1, the population is exposed and it is sensitive to the external influence. Then, the parameter ω measures the relative contribution of two opposite advertisement sources, favorable to each available alternative. According to Eq. (3), the action of the external fields is symmetric around ω = 0.5, under the transformation ω → 1 − ω,
In particular, if ω = 0.5, both external fields contribute in the same measure, and the system is perfectly symmetric with respect to the two opposite opinions. In the extreme cases ω = 0 and ω = 1, a single external influence is present. Due to this symmetry, we choose to analyze one of the intervals, namely ω ∈ [0.5, 1], which corresponds to fields favoring opinion o = 1.
Results
We run the Monte Carlo dynamics ruled by the algorithm defined by Eqs.
(1)-(3), in fully connected networks. In order to followed the evolution of the collective state of the system, we measure the fractions f k of individuals with opinion k = −1, 0, 1.
In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the temporal evolution of the fractions of both opinions, in the case φ = 0.05 and ω = 1 (recall, that, by Eq.(3), this setting favors option o = 1), for two different levels of contrarian behavior. In both cases, two initial values of (f 1 , f −1 ) are considered. We see that for the level of contrarians p = 0.4, in the left panel, independently of the initial conditions, (f 1 , f −1 ) evolves towards a state where the opinion favored by the field wins, despite φ << 1. Differently, for a low level of contrarians (e.g., p = 0.1, in the right panel), the final collective state depends on the initial condition and even the opinion favored by the field can end up losing (squares). This This portrait can be understood analytically. Considering that the dynamics occurs on the complete graph topology, we obtain the mean-field equations for the transition rates of each opinion
where the functions G 1 and G −1 and their derivation is given in the Appendix. The dashed lines in Fig. 1 were obtained via numerical integration of Eqs.
(4) and (5), showing a complete agreement with the results of Monte Carlo numerical simulations. The influence of initial conditions can be visualized through the flux diagrams in Fig. 2 , where the same two initial conditions of For the case where φ = 0, there is a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation, and two solutions with complementary values of f 1 and f −1 . This is in accord with the continuous phase transition observed for the order parameter black line in the inset of Fig. 3(b) ).
Differently, when a small field is switched on, the pitchfork branches detach. (Hence, the continuous transition observed for φ = 0 is suppressed, because the critical curve splits into two.) Despite the imperfect bifurcation that arises for 0 < φ < φ c = 0.5, the field may still be unable to produce a winner, depending on the initial conditions. Only stronger fields (φ ≥ φ c , see inset of Fig. 3(a) ) are capable of imposing a winner independently of the initial configuration, since f −1 present a single branch above that tipping point. Also notice, in the inset of Fig. 3(b) , the behavior of the density of un- It is also worth observing the effect of the field for fixed values of p, which means to consider a society with a given level of nonconformity. In Fig. 4 , we plot the bifurcation diagram for f 1 as a function of φ (ω = 1) for several values of p. From this point of view, bistability is possible if p is low enough.
In this case, if the system is in the lower branch, then, by increasing the field φ above the tipping point, it will jump to the upper branch. Once in the upper branch, it cannot come back to the lower one just by reverting the change of the field, or even by completely turning off the field, except by a strong finite-size fluctuation. Differently, a large enough proportion of contrarians (p > 0.25) eliminates the lower branch of the steady solution for f 1 , making opinion o = 1 win, independently of the initial configuration of the system. That is, contrarians make the field more effective, by muffling the contribution of mutual interactions. Let us analyze now the case 0.5 ≤ ω < 1, where a contribution of an opposite field appears. Recall that while φ controls the sensitivity to any external field, ω is the relative strength of the field favorable to opinion o = 1. Therefore, for ω = 0.5, both fields have the same presence in the media, while as ω gradually goes to 1 (or 0), the field favorable to o = 1 (or to -1) has the strongest impact. Figure 5 shows the behavior of f 1 as a function of p for several values of φ, with ω = 0.6 (a) and ω = 0.5 (b). These plots must be compared to those in Fig. 2(a) , which corresponds to ω = 1. Notice, that decreasing ω from 1 to 0.5, allows bistability to occur for increasing values of φ and the diagrams tend to a perfect pitchfork, which is attained at ω = 0.5 (equal strength of both opposed fields), illustrated in Fig. 5(b) .
For ω = 0.5, above the critical value, the system is disordered, in the Plots of f 1 vs ω are presented in Fig. 6 , for several values of φ. Parameter ω changes the predominance of the fields, being balanced at ω = 0.5. Then, around this value, the roles of o = 1 and o = −1 are inverted, as shown in the inset of Fig. 6(a) . When increasing ω from 0.5 to 1 (meaning increasing predominance of the field associated to opinion o = 1), the system can even-tually jump to a distant fixed point, and recovery is not possible, even if the dominant field is reversed, except when undergoing a large finite-size fluctuation, configuring an irreversible transition with hysteresis. This is similar to the hysteresis behavior observed by changing φ with ω = 1 in Fig. 4 . A full landscape of f 1 vs φ ω for a fixed level of disagreement is depicted in Fig. 6(b) . 
Final remarks
We investigated the effects of external fields in a kinetic exchange opinion dynamics, observing how interpersonal and global external influences drive the collective dynamics. In the absence of external fields, when opinions are taken by exchanges between peers, there is a pitchfork bifurcation at a critical value p c = 0.25, signaling a continuous order/disorder transition. This kind of diagram also emerges when there are balanced external influences. When an external bias is turned on, the pitchfork disconnects into two pieces as depicted in Fig. 3 . This has important implications concerning the fate of the collective state when the social group is subject to external bias. An increase of the field can produce an abrupt change of the winner alternative, which is very difficult to be reversed even if the external field is suppressed, as shown in Figs. 4 and 6 . Therefore the external influence of the media can produce the phenomenon known in nonlinear theory as catastrophe. It is noteworthy that a similar picture was observed due to the presence of zealots [13] , which somehow act with their extremist attitude as a unilateral biased influence, although of internal origin. The level of disagreement in the population plays a role in moderating the effect of the field, with its disorganizing role. But opposite fields are disorganizing too. Concerning indecision, the number of undecided people is reduced by the biased driving, since this group is more sensitive to the effect of the field, adopting more easily than an opponent the opinion favored by the field.
Then, an initially large number of people in the undecided state reinforces the effect of the field. This is due to the role of the undecided in mediating exchanges [9, 11, 12] and also to their larger susceptibility.
Finally let us note that, these results may give insights to understand more complex situations where opinions co-evolve with other dynamics such as epidemics [17] , where the epidemic state can act as a (time variable) field molding opinion dynamics.
A Derivation of the rate equations
We obtain the matrix of transition probabilities in which the element m r,s is the probability of the change of state r → s, following a simple meanfield approach. We consider all possible combinations in Eq. can solve Eq. (4) analytically using f 0 from Eq. (9) . The behavior of f 1 vs φ is illustrated in Fig. 7 . It is noteworthy that there are two stable ordered solutions of f 1 . Meanwhile, f −1 has the same solutions, assuming complementary values. Then, we obtain |∆| ∼ |p − p c | β where β = 1/2, the typical mean field exponent for continuous phase transition [18] .
